Artificial Life Meets Computational Creativity? by McMullin, Barry
Artificial Life Meets Computational Creativity?∗
Presented at
Computational Creativity : An Interdisciplinary Approach†
12–17 July, 2009, Dagstuhl, Germany
Barry McMullin‡
Dublin City University
July 2009
Abstract
I review the history of work in Artificial Life on the problem of the open-ended
evolutionary growth of complexity in computational worlds. This is then put into
the context of evolutionary epistemology and human creativity.
∗Parts of this text are based on a book chapter, co-authored with Wolfgang Banzhaf, for the forthcom-
ing Springer Handbook of Natural Computing (Rozenberg et al., 2010).
†http://www.dagstuhl.de/en/program/calendar/semhp/?semnr=09291
‡http://www.eeng.dcu.ie/˜mcmullin/
1
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 09291 
Computational Creativity : An Interdisciplinary Approach 
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2200
1 Introduction
By extending the horizons of empirical research in biology beyond the
territory currently circumscribed by life-as-we-know-it, the study of Artifi-
cial Life gives us access to the domain of life-as-it-could-be, and it is within
this vastly larger domain that we must ground general theories of biology
and in which we will discover practical and useful applications of biology
in our engineering endeavors.
—Chris Langton1
The domain of this Dagstuhl seminar has been the use or application of computers
in realising “creativity” — understood particularly as what is recognised as creative in
human activity. This may take the form of computer aids or amplifiers of human cre-
ativity; but also standalone computational systems which are claimed to demonstrate
some autonomous creative phenomena. In this contribution I focus particularly on
the latter case, in the form of autonomous, computationally realised, “virtual worlds”.
I review attempts to understand, through building such systems, the conditions and
constraints on such spontaneous creativity. This work is typically classified as falling
within the field of Artificial Life.
2 Constructive and Autopoietic Systems
The notion of creativity is often related to more general concepts of emergence and
complex organisation. Within the field of Artificial Life, this bears on what may be
called “self-constructing” systems. Natural life, at all hierarchical levels, exhibits a
characteristic ability to maintain its system organisation while simultaneously turn-
ing over components at the lower hierarchical levels. Thus, a cell can stably maintain
itself (and even grow and divide) while continuously regenerating all its significant
molecular components (metabolising environmental substrates as necessary); simi-
larly, a multi-cellular organism maintains its organisation while constantly replacing
its component cells; and a social insect colony may long outlive most, if not all, of its
constituent individual organisms. While this is a typical phenomenon of natural life,
it is very different from the behaviour of conventional engineered systems. The lat-
ter may well have complex hierarchical organisation, but this organisation is typically
static: the system is assembled once, and then retains its fixed compositional structure
for its functional lifetime. Indeed, it is typical of engineered systems that failure of
any component, at any hierarchical level, will at least significantly impair system level
function, and will commonly result in full system failure. Although so-called “fault
tolerant” systems may be engineered to incorporate significant redundancy, this often
involves static assembly of additional components at manufacture time. Functional
lifetime is extended as failing components are automatically removed from service; but
once this pre-built redundancy is exhausted, system failure follows from any further
1http://www.biota.org/papers/cglalife.html
2
component failure. Further, even such redundant systems are generally vulnerable to
failures in the “failure detecting” components which cannot also simply be duplicated
without potentially entering into infinite regress.
This is a complex problem to address, but natural life provides a “proof of princi-
ple” that such self-constructing organisations are possible. Artificial Life certainly of-
fers a potentially very fruitful avenue for further investigation. In particular, Artificial
Life allows “virtual worlds” to be formulated in which problems of self-construction
can be simplified, and the core organisational mechanisms can be exposed and sub-
jected both to mathematical analysis and experimental exploration. While a variety of
work in Artificial Life bears on this, some of the most direct contributions might be
summarised as follows:
• The Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela pioneered the abstract concept of
autopoiesis (literally “self-production”) as a description of the core mechanism of
organisational self-maintenance in biological cells (Varela et al., 1974). Almost 15
years before the modern computational study of Artificial Life was even named
(Langton, 1989), they were already using a molecular level, agent-based, abstract
chemistry to give a concrete demonstration of this abstract theory of cellular or-
ganisation. In essence, the proposal is that biological cells are dynamic, self-
sustaining, chemical networks (an abstraction of cell metabolism), which also cre-
ate and maintain a spatial boundary (an abstraction of a cell membrane), where
the contained network and the boundary reciprocally rely on each other for sta-
bility. While some technical deficiencies were identified in the original presenta-
tion of this work (McMullin and Varela, 1997), it has given rise to a sustained and
continuing programme of active research (McMullin, 2004).
• Also in the 1970’s, Holland proposed the so-called α-universes (Holland, 1976)
and, independently, Hofstadter described the Typogenetics system (Hofstadter,
1979). Both involved one-dimensional fragments of computer code, which could
interact with each other. In both cases, they were explicitly inspired by as-
pects of the molecular replication and translation machinery of biology, and
were concerned with understanding the reflexive interactions that arise when the
“same” class of entities (molecules) can sometimes function as executable “code”
(emzyme/protein) and sometimes as literal “data” (nucleic acid), and the pos-
sibility of collective self-reproduction and maintenance. These were, however,
restricted to theoretical/analytic treatments, and were not subject to empirical in-
vestigation until much later (McMullin, 1992; Snare, 1999; Kvasnicka et al., 2001).
• This same tension between syntax and semantics in materially instantiated dy-
namic systems is also at the core of Pattee’s analysis of what he terms “semantic
closure” (Rocha, 2000; Cariani, 1992).
• A related, but independent line of investigation was pioneered by Kauffman and
others, in the form of “collectively autocatalytic sets” (Farmer et al., 1986; Kauff-
man, 1993). Such a set is formally similar to (though more strictly defined than)
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the contained chemical network of an autopoietic system, but without the re-
quirement for a self-generated spatial boundary. The key result here was the
demonstration, in completely abstract virtual “chemistries” that such collectively
autocatalytic sets can spontaneously arise, quickly and under relatively weak
constraints on the underlying chemistry.
• Fontana and Buss self-consciously launched a mathematical and computational
investigation of “constructive dynamical systems”, based around the so-called
Alchemy system (Fontana and Buss, 1994). These systems deliberately diverge
from the classical concept of “dynamical systems” by relaxing the normally strict
demarcation between “state variable” and “dynamic law”. The authors demon-
strated and analysed a number of organisational phenomena, including forms
of “self-sustaining closure” where more-or-less complex dynamic aggregates of
components successfully sustain themselves, even as all the individual compo-
nents are continuously diluted or degraded.
• As a comprehensive overview treatment, Dittrich et al. (2001) provide a summary
of the general approach of building computational models of arbitrary “artificial
chemistries”, as a platform for investigating these and other problems. More re-
cently, Dittrich and Speroni have developed a primarily algebraic mathematical
analysis in a comprehensive way, in the form of Chemical Organisation Theory (Dit-
trich and di Fenizio, 2007). However, while an important advance, the difficul-
ties of incorporating dynamics (chemical kinetics) and the interaction of chemical
self-production and spatial demarcation (the self-constructed “boundary” of au-
topoietic theory) remain substantial.
• A quite different and more radical approach to the problem of biological self-
maintenance was proposed by the theoretical biologist Rosen over an extended
series of works (Rosen, 1959, 1972, 1985, 1991). In brief, Rosen argues that the
self-constructing organisation characteristic of natural living systems which he
termed “closure under efficient causation” transcends the possibilities of con-
ventional dynamical systems in a fundamental way; with the consequence that
it cannot be realised in any “computational” universe. This is a complex and
contentious theoretical claim which, not surprisingly, continues to be the focus
of considerable critique and criticsm (e.g., Chu and Ho, 2006). Rosen’s work was
also a strong influence in Kampis’ development of a comprehensive mathemati-
cal treatment of what he terms “self-modifying” systems (Kampis, 1991).
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3 A Core Problem of Creation: Computing the Evolu-
tionary Growth of Complexity
There is a concept which will be quite useful here, of which we have a
certain intuitive idea, but which is vague, unscientific, and imperfect . . . I
know no adequate name for it, but it is best described by calling it “com-
plication.” It is effectivity in complication, or the potentiality to do things.
I am not thinking about how involved the object is, but how involved its
purposive operations are. In this sense, an object is of the highest degree of
complexity if it can do very difficult and involved things.
— John von Neumann (von Neumann, 1949, p. 78, emphasis added)
Arguably the most fundamental problem in the theory of biology is that of the
growth of “complexity”; with “complexity” understood in the sense explained by von
Neumann above, of the ability to do complicated things. While this is certainly an
informal definition, it suffices to clearly demarcate this notion from purely syntactic,
combinatorial or computational concepts of complexity. Complexity in this sense is
also clearly related to at least some meanings of “creativity”.
Von Neumann is a key figure in the early development of abstract computational
modelling approaches to understanding biological phenomena; indeed, in this respect
he can be considered as having instigated the earliest investigations in Artificial Life,
as the term is now understood (McMullin, 2000a). In particular, in the late 1940’s he
started to draw attention to an apparent paradox arising from the contrast between
any mechanistic (i.e., not vitalistic) understanding of living organisms and common
experience of engineering artificial mechanisms or automata (von Neumann, 1949).
While it is quite generally possible to design machines that construct other machines,
this process is normally degenerative in complexity: a machine of a given complexity
(such as an automated factory) can only construct machines of comparatively lower
complexity (such as cars or phones or televisions etc.). Whereas, if the theory of Dar-
winian evolution is accepted, then biological “machines” (organisms) must be capable
of constructing descendant machines of greater complexity. Granted, these increases
in complexity may occur only in very small increments, and even then only in some
lineages and accumulating over geological periods of time; but nonetheless it must be
possible, in principle, for biological organisms to give rise to offspring more complex
than themselves.
Von Neumann quickly developed an outline resolution of this paradox, in the
abstract form of what he termed a “general constructive automaton”. This was in-
spired by Turing’s earlier formulation of a universal computing automaton (Turing,
1936), and also by von Neumann’s own contemporaneous involvement in designing
and building the earliest electronic stored program digital computers (von Neumann,
1945). In essence, a general constructive automaton is a programmable constructor or as-
sembler, capable of constructing an indefinitely large set of target automata — loosely,
a “universal” set comprised of all automata that could be assembled from a given,
finite, set of primitive components. Significantly, von Neumann hypothesised that a
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general constructive automaton, relative to a specific set of components, might itself
be realisable as an assembly of these same components. With this conceptual archi-
tecture and some relatively minor technical elaboration, von Neumann showed that
this then would give rise to an indefinitely large set of automata, spanning an indef-
inite large range of complexity, all of which would be fully connected by a network
of heritable “mutations” (essentially, chance variations in the construction programs).
That is, there would exist mutational pathways leading from the simplest to arbitrarily
complex members of this set; with all these machines also, incidentally, being capable
of self-reproduction.2
In retrospect this was already an astonishing achievement. Von Neumann effec-
tively described the abstract architecture of biological self-reproduction, based on sep-
arate processes of syntactic copying (replication) and semantic “decoding” (transla-
tion) of a passive information carrier; he showed how this architecture supported self-
reproduction, heritable mutation, and thus evolutionary growth of complexity; and
he presented all this, at least in outline form, in 1948, five years before the chemical
structure of DNA was even identified (von Neumann, 1949).
However, as yet this was still only a sketch of a solution. To make it properly con-
vincing, he needed to present a concrete set of “primitive parts” and show that with
these, it would actually be possible to realise an example of a general constructive au-
tomaton. This proved to be a complicated and potentially intractable problem: any
plausible “real world” set of components would introduce many ancillary complica-
tions — mechanics, thermodynamics, etc. Following a suggestion from Ulam, von
Neumann instead formulated an artificial, virtual, world that would simplify away
these ancillary complications. He proposed a two dimensional “tesselation automa-
ton”, or, as it is now called, a cellular automaton. Within this simplified virtual world,
von Neumann then successfully developed a fully detailed design for an example of
a general constructive automaton. He had planned this as a first step in a much more
general and comprehensive “theory of automata”. However, he put his unfinished
manuscript aside in 1953; and due to his untimely death in 1957, was never to return
to this project. The manuscript was subsequently edited by Burks and formally pub-
lished in 1966 (Burks, 1966).
Von Neumann’s achievement, both in theoretical insight and technical implementa-
tion, was considerable, and it gave rise to an extended programme of further research.
Many different cellular automata worlds have been formulated and investigated, and
many variants on von Neumann’s architecture for evolvable self-reproducing au-
tomata have been demonstrated (Thatcher, 1970; Codd, 1968; Langton, 1984). Con-
way’s Game of Life has particularly popularised the study of “life-life” phenomena in
cellular automata worlds (Berlekamp et al., 1982). More recently, it has become feasible
to actually implement von Neumann’s original designs on real computers (Pesavento,
1995). Cellular automata have also, of course, featured as inspiration and realisation of
various art works and installations (e.g., Brown, 1996; Satomi and Sommerer, 2007).
2While terminology in the field is not completely consistent, in this paper I will reserve
“(self-)reproduction” to mean this von Neumann style process, involving separate actions of copying
and decoding; whereas “(self-)replication” is used to denote a process of copying only.
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Nonetheless, seminal as this work was, it also explicitly left certain questions still
very much unresolved. In particular, as von Neumann himself was clearly aware, the
mere existence of mutational pathways from simple to complex automata does not
mean that evolution will actually follow such pathways. Indeed, in von Neumann’s
original cellular automaton world, the embedded self-reproducing machine was ex-
tremely fragile. It could only operate successfully at all on the condition that the rest
of the world was completely quiescent; and, of course, once it completes one round of
reproduction, that could no longer be the case. Parent and offspring would then inter-
fere with each other’s structure and operation, and both would rapidly distintegrate.
While this problem could be superficially avoided by constraining each complete, suc-
cessively constructed automaton to restrict its further operation to separate regions of
the space, it rules out any possibility of natural selection; and, in any case, cannot be
sustained in the long term if there is any possibility of stochastic, component level, mal-
function or failure (which itself is actually desirable, as a source of the random variation
that is the grist to the mill of Darwinian evolution).
4 Coreworlds: Spontaneous Evolution of Computer Pro-
grams
Nothing in Biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.
— Theodosius Dobzhansky 1973
Discovering how to make such self-reproducing patterns more robust
so that they can evolve to increasingly more complex states is probably the
central problem in the study of artificial life.
— J. Doyne Farmer and Alletta d’A. Belin 1992
Although the cellular automata models of von Neumann and his successors have
not, to date, demonstrated extended evolutionary dynamics, various other Artificial
life models have addressed evolution more directly, through attempts to demonstrate
evolution among populations of virtual (software) agents in virtual worlds. The most
systematically investigated framework is to envisage these as small machine code pro-
grams, each executed by a separate, parallel, processor, but all sharing a single main
memory (“core”). Generically, these approaches can be referred to as coreworlds. In
principle, the parallelism could be implemented directly with a sufficiently large pool
of hardware processing elements, dynamically allocated as agents are created or de-
stroyed; but it is typically just realised with conventional timeslice-based multithread-
ing of a much smaller pool of hardware CPUs (often just one).
The earliest work adopting this methodological approach can be traced to the sem-
inal investigations of Barricelli (1957, 1963) from 1953-1957. In fact, this work was
carried out on the original computer designed and built at the Princeton Institute for
Advanced Studies (IAS) between 1946 and 1952 under the direction of von Neumann.
Barricelli was a visitor to the institute at von Neumann’s invitation; and took the op-
portunity to conduct an investigation of the role of “symbiogenesis” in the origin of
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life. He programmed the IAS computer to directly model patterns of numbers which
could interact with each other within a circular array (effectively the main memory
system of the machine), according to some fixed local rules. This is conceptually simi-
lar to a one-dimensional cellular automaton. Although these patterns of numbers did
not have the general computing ability of Turing machines, Barricelli demonstrated the
existence of patterns which could self-replicate, as well as various forms of competi-
tive and co-operative (symbiotic) interaction between patterns. Somewhat strangely, in
his published description of this work, Barricelli only obliquely related it to von Neu-
mann’s own contemporary work on self-reproducing and evolving automata. In any
case, the insight and innovation of this work was not widely recognised at the time,
and has only recently been properly re-instated through George Dyson’s investigations
of the early history of digital computing at the IAS (Dyson, 1997, 1998).
The first attempt to study the dynamics of competition among co-resident self-
replicating programs in a shared memory was pioneered by Vyssotsky et. al. at Bell
Labs in the early 1960’s (though not published until 1972), and appears to have been
independent of Barricelli’s study (Vyssotsky, 1972). This was effectively created as a
form of computer programming game in which different programmers provided hand-
coded programs, which were then instantiated in a common core, and executed to see
which would survive longest. Again, self-replication was a key feature. An interest-
ing aspect was that, unlike almost all later work, these programs were implemented in
the native (IBM 7090) machine code, rather than in a virtual machine code to be exe-
cuted by an interpreter. This allowed comparatively much higher execution speed, but
with some associated limitations. For example, as programs could not be written to be
position-independent, successful self-replication required active relocation processing,
as opposed to simple self-copying. In this early implementation, a “lethal” program
was relatively quickly developed by R.H. Morris, and the original game was put aside.
We should mention again here also the α-universes described by Holland in the
mid-1970’s (Holland, 1976). Although formulated independently, and with quite dif-
ferent motivations, this proposal has similarlities to both the Barricelli and Vyssotsky
systems. In particular, it again envisaged an essentially linear core memory inhabited
by concurrently executing fragments of computer code. However, in other ways this
was actually much closer to Barricelli’s work in that the specific intention was to inves-
tigate the spontaneous emergence of crude collective self-reproduction activity, rather
than simple competition between programs pre-coded by human programmers; but, in
any case, this system was not experimentally investigated until much later (McMullin,
1992).
The more direct descendent of the Vyssotsky system was the Core War game, de-
veloped by Dewdney and others in the early 1980’s. This now relied on an interpreter
and offered much more varied gameplay opportunities (Dewdney, 1984). Following
the establishment of an international tournament (Dewdney, 1987), Core War has had
a sustained following, and remains active to this day.3
Although the Core War framework is predicated on the idea of human program-
mers coding the competing programs, it does also naturally lead to the question of
3http://corewars.org/
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whether, under conditions of potential mutation during self-replication, there could
be an autonomous and sustained evolutionary process, not relying on programmer in-
tervention. This was explicitly studied by Rasmussen et. al. in a system they called
the Coreworld (Rasmussen et al., 1990). In this instantiation however, the system suf-
fered from a similar limitation to that of the von Neumann style cellular automata
systems. While the world could be seeded with an initial self-replicating program,
as its offspring filled up the core they quickly begin overwriting each other and the
self-replicating functionality and thus the potential for sustained Darwinian evolution
was lost. This issue was addressed by Ray, in the Tierra system, developed and in-
vestigated in the early 1990’s (Ray, 1992). Tierra was based on the idea of competing
and interacting self-replicating programs in a shared core memory. Programs were
now given an ability to employ “memory protection” to limit overwriting by other
programs. On its own, this would simply lead to the core filling with programs once,
and then no further self-replication (much less evolution) would be possible. To over-
come this, Ray added a mechanism for random removal of programs (the so-called
“reaper”). This addition allowed for continuing self-replication and the possibility for
longer term evolution. He also adopted a significantly different instruction set, incor-
porating a biologically inspired “template” addressing mode. With these innovations,
Ray was able to demonstrate an extended process of evolution, with multiple episodes
of Darwinian natural selection. The system produced a surprising array of evolution-
ary phenomena, including optimisation of program length, obligate parasitism and
facultative “hyper-parasitism” (as a defence against obligate parasites).
Tierra has led to a wide variety of related work, such as:
• The Avida system of Adami and Brown which introduced a more conventional
spatial 2-D spatial world in which programs would colonise nodes, and also
be evaluated for their ability to complete extrinsically defined computing tasks
(Adami and Brown, 1994).
• A proposed extension to Tierra into a multiprocessor networked environment
ultimately to be distributed across the wider Internet, under suitable “sandbox”
execution controls (Ray, 1995).
• Nanopond4, a highly simplified implementation of a 2-D spatial “program evolu-
tion” system, drawing on elements of both Tierra and Avida, but implemented in
less than 1,000 lines of C source code.
• The Amoeba system, developed by Pargellis, which specifically demonstrated the
possibility of spontaneous emergence of a self-replicating program in coreworld-
like systems (Pargellis, 2001).
4http://adam.ierymenko.name/nanopond.shtml
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Evolution in coreworlds can also usefully be compared and contrasted with several
other related but divergent research fields and investigations:
• There has been a separate line of line of research into the logic of so-called Quine
programs. These are defined as computer programs which produce their own
source code as output. The original discussion is generally credited to Bratley
and Millo (1972), though the term “Quine program” is usually attributed to Hof-
stadter (1979). The existence of Quine programs in general purpose program-
ming languages essentially follows from Kleene’s recursion theorem. But while
the formulation of specific Quine programs in different languages has been a
hobby among programmers, these programs have not generally been embedded
within an execution environment in which exponential growth, Darwinian selec-
tion, and evolution could actually take place. It has not therefore, particularly in-
fluenced research approaches in Artificial Life. That said, through its definitional
restriction to programs that must self-reproduce without having direct access to
self-inspection, the study of Quine programs draws attention to the logical dis-
tinction between properly von Neumann style genetic “self-reproduction” and
the “self-replication” by copying normally adopted in coreworlds. It is, in fact, a
very open question as to what the effect of this architectural choice is on evolu-
tionary potential (McMullin et al., 2001).
• The replication and propagation of programs in controlled coreworld environ-
ments obviously also leads to the idea of self-replicating programs propagating
in open networked computer environments. This is the realm of computer mal-
ware — computer viruses, worms etc. And indeed, this connection was explic-
itly made by Dewdney already in the immediate aftermath of the Morris Internet
worm incident in 1988 (Dewdney, 1989). However, while malware development
certainly involves an arms race between the human developers on both sides,
there is to date no evidence of effective autonomous evolution of “free-living” mal-
ware.
• There is significant overlap in inspiration between evolution in coreworld-like
systems, and work in evolutionary algorithms, and, especially, genetic program-
ming (GP) (Koza, 1992; Willis et al., 1997; Banzhaf et al., 1998). This, in turn,
has a long history extending back at least to Samuel’s late 1950’s investigations
in machine learning (Arthur, 1959). However, the major distinction is that GP
is generally driven, directly or indirectly, by an externally provided evaluation
function (used as an extrinic “fitness” to drive an imposed evolutionary algo-
rithm) rather than the coreworld approach which is to investigate spontaneous
autonomous evolutionary dynamics, in which the software agents are responsi-
ble for their own replication and relative fitness emerges from their bottom-up
ecological interactions.
• Investigations into the evolution of co-operation by Axelrod and others should
also be mentioned here (Axelrod, 1984, 1987). Although not generally using a
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coreworld-like framework, and focussed on a relatively narrowly defined pat-
tern of interaction (the iterated prisoner’s dilemma), using an extrinsically ap-
plied genetic algorithm, this examination of the problem of co-operation, and
co-evolution between “co-operating” and “defecting” strategies, has been very
influential in the wider fields of political science, ecology, and complexity theory.
To summarise, the general experience of the investigation to date of evolution in
coreworld-like systems is that the evolutionary potential of these systems is interest-
ing but still strictly limited. Indeed, they can be viewed as formally similar to pure
artificial “replicator chemistries”, comparable to the systems already mentioned in
section 2 above, and exhibiting similar phenomena of collective autocatalyic closure
and self-maintenance (McMullin, 2000b). Thus, both von Neumann style genetic self-
reproduction in cellular authomaton worlds, and replication by simple copying or self-
inspection in coreworlds, naturally lead directly into the problems of biological robust-
ness, self-maintenance, and hierarchical organisation already discussed above. The in-
tegration of self-reproducing or self-replicating programs with self-maintenance and
individuation (autopoiesis), and the demonstration of sustained evolutionary growth
of complexity in a purely virtual world remains perhaps the key “grand challenge”
problem in the field of Artificial Life.
5 Conclusion: Back to Computational Creativity
In presenting this review of computational Artificial Life, and particularly the evolu-
tion of complexity, I have suggested that this can be usefully related to more general
problems of computational creativity. In concluding then, it is appropriate to return to
this claim, and at least outline a basis for such connections.
I take the view that the form of complexity discussed above is essentially equiva-
lent to genetically recorded knowledge: that is, systems grow in complexity to the extent
that they develop internal predictive models of their worlds, which allow them to an-
ticipate, plan, and interact, in evolutionarily effective ways. In this sense, Darwinian
evolution is a process of knowledge growth, typically taking place over geological
timescales and using DNA as an information repository. The knowledge which results
is realised in the genetically constrained development, morphology, and behaviours of
organisms; and it is, manifestly, highly context-dependent and fallible.
A natural question is how this growth of genetically recorded knowledge relates to
the more familiar, somatic time, growth of knowledge in an individual human mind,
and its expression, communication and collective growth in a human culture; and this
is relevant because the latter is surely a characteristic example of human creativity.
The nature of our knowledge of the world, or epistemology in general, is, of course,
a foundational problem in philosophy. I will not attempt to reprise millennia of de-
bate here but will simply advocate one particular position. This is the evolutionary
epistemology pioneered by Popper (1976) and Campbell (1974). This holds that our
individual, learned, human knowledge, and our accumulated human cultural knowl-
edge is fundamentally no different from our biologically derived evolutionary, genetic
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knowledge. That is, human knowledge is also irredeemably context-dependent, and
ultimately fallible; and insofar as it grows, both for an individual and an entire human
civilization, it does so by a process formally identical with that realised by biological
evolution, namely unjustified variation and selective retention.
While this is by no means a consensus position in modern epistemology, it does en-
joy a reasonably broad level of support. In particular, it is the foundation for the Uni-
versal Selection Theory of Cziko (1995); and provides a philosophical basis for Edelman
(1987)’s Neural Darwinism and Calvin (1996)’s Neural Darwin Machine, both of which
address the realisation of essentially Darwinian evolutionary processes in the somatic
time development and behaviour of complex nervous systems.
So if all of this can be accepted, then computational realisations of Darwinian pro-
cesses, which demonstrate spontaneous and sustained growth of complexity, would
constitute the strongest examples which I can currently imagine of autonomous com-
putational creativity; and in doing so, would surely shed much light on deep aspects
of human creative activities. Of course, while I have summarised much interesting
work on these problems, the outstanding difficulties, both practical and theoretical,
remain deep seated. Nonetheless, I hope that I have demonstrated the substantial con-
fluence of interest between computational evolution and computational creativity, and
the potential for continuing fruitful interactions between researchers from these two
communities.
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